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Abstract
Laont and Tirole [3] show that when the uncertainty about the agent's ability is
small, the equilibrium must involve a large amount of pooling, but it is not necessary
to be a partition equilibrium. They construct a nonpartition continuation equilib-
rium for a given rst-period menu of contracts and conjecture that this continuation
equilibrium need not be suboptimal for the whole game under small uncertainty.
We show that, irrespective of the amount of uncertainty, this nonpartition continu-
ation equilibrium generates a smaller payo for the principal than a dierent menu
of contracts with a partition continuation equilibrium. In this sense, Laont and
Tirole's menu of contracts, giving rise to a nonpartition continuation equilibrium, is
not optimal. An intuition behind this result is provided that may shed some light
on the problem of dynamic contracting without commitment.
Keywords: Incentive Contracts; Dynamic Contracting; Commitment; Partition
Equilibrium; Ratchet Eect; Bunching.
JEL classication: D86; L51
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1 Introduction
In a pioneering paper that extends their static analysis of cost regulation (Laont and
Tirole [2]) to a dynamic framework, Laont and Tirole [3] study a two-period princi-
pal/agent model in which the principal cannot commit himself to second-period actions
and the agent's type space is a continuum. In the rst period, the principal oers an
incentive scheme and observes the agent's performance (cost), which depends on the
agent's ability and rst-period eort (both of which are unobservable). In the second
period, the principal is allowed to update the incentive scheme, and the agent is free
to accept the new scheme or to quit. Even though they are not able to characterize
the whole set of feasible incentive schemes and solve for the optimal contract, some
important properties are derived. First, they show that for any given rst-period incen-
tive scheme, there exists no separating continuation equilibrium; hence, some pooling
is necessary in equilibrium. Moreover, they show that when the uncertainty about the
agent's ability is small, the equilibrium must involve a large amount of pooling (to be
dened in the next section), but it is not necessary to be a partition equilibrium. They
construct a nonpartition continuation equilibrium for a given rst-period menu with two
contracts and conjecture that this continuation equilibrium need not be suboptimal for
small uncertainty.
We demonstrate that, whether the uncertainty is small or not, Laont and Tirole's
menu of contracts, giving rise to a nonpartition continuation equilibrium, is not optimal.
To do this, we construct two rst-period incentive schemes leading to partition continu-
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ation equilibria and show that one of the two partition continuation equilibria gives the
principal higher payos. The intuition of our proof comes from the trade-o between
eciency distortion and the information rent eect.
Nearly two decades after their publication, no one has been able to fully characterize
the whole set of incentive contracts and solve for the optimal dynamic contract. The
diculty arises from the failure of the revelation principle in repeated relationships with-
out commitment caused by the ratchet eect. Recognizing the diculty of probing for
a full characterization of equilibria, some authors focus their analyses on dynamic con-
tracting without commitment in a restricted class of equilibria. Caillaud and Mezzetti
[1] study equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions. They analyze the
equilibrium reserve prices in the set of \equilibria with separation under participation."
An equilibrium with separation under participation is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which in the rst period bidders with valuations above some threshold v follow a
symmetric, strictly increasing bidding strategy, and bidders with valuations below v do
not participate.1 They show that in equilibrium the seller chooses the rst-auction re-
serve price to induce a positive measure of bidder types to participate, but the measure
of participating types is smaller than in a one-shot auction. Sun [5] studies dynamic
price discrimination and quality provision with customer recognition. Within the class
of partition equilibria, he shows that in equilibrium the rm nds it optimal to oer a
single contract in the rst period when the social surplus function is log submodular or
1Notice that the partition property of the continuation equilibrium is implied by the assumption of
symmetry, as all types who choose not to participate are below v:
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consumers are patient. Moreover, if the rm's optimal strategy is to oer a single con-
tract in the rst period, then the rm chooses to serve fewer consumers than in the static
setup, and some consumers downgrade the product in the second period. Hence solving
for the optimal contract in repeated relationships without commitment is possible if we
impose the symmetry or partition assumption in equilibrium. However, can we justify
restricting the analysis to the set of partition equilibria? Some possible justications will
be discussed in the next section.
This note proceeds as follows. In the next section, we introduce the static model and
summarize the main results obtained by Laont and Tirole [2]. In section 3, we briey
introduce the dynamic model and present the nonpartition equilibrium constructed by
Laont and Tirole, and show that it is suboptimal. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Static Model
Consider a regulator who wants to ask a rm to implement a valuable indivisible project.
The cost of the project depends on the rm's eciency type  and the eort level e
performed by the rm's manager. Specically, the cost structure of the project is
c =    e (1)
The regulator can observe the realized cost c; but not the rm's type  or eort
level e. The rm knows its own type , and the regulator believes that  is distributed
on [; ] with strictly positive density f() and cumulative distribution F (); all of
which is common knowledge: We assume that the hazard rate is monotone, i.e., F ()f() is
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nondecreasing. Dene a contract as a transfer-cost pair (s; c) that species the monetary
transfer s the rm can get by carrying out the project at cost c: With a slight abuse
of notation, we use s(c) to represent the transfer in the pair (s; c). Let C  R2 denote
the menu of contracts oered by the regulator. For a given menu C; a rm with type
 chooses a contract in C (and, hence, the eort level e as they are one-to-one) to
maximize the transfer, s(c); less the disutility of eort,  (e) =  ( c); where  0 > 0 and
 00 > 0. For a given C, dene the prot function for type  as () = max(s;c)2C s(c) 
 (   c); (s(c()); c()) a corresponding contract that maximizes rm 0s prot, i.e.,
(s(c()); c()) 2 argmax(s;c)2C s(c)   (   c); and e() =    c(): A rm with type 
takes a contract i the individual rationality constraint ()  0 is met; otherwise the
rm exercises its exit option to quit:
Let u be the social utility of the project. The gross payment made by the regulator
to the rm is s + c: Assume that for each unit of money raised by the regulator, there
is a distortionary cost  > 0 (it could be the cost from levying taxes): The regulator's
problem is to choose C  R2 to maximize the social surplus:2
W = max
CR2
R

[u  (1 + )[s(c()) + c()] + ()]dF () (2)
s:t: () = s(c())   (e())  0;  2 [; ]
By invoking the revelation principle, the envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal [4])
and integration by parts, we obtain the following results that will be used frequently in
the proof of Lemma 1:
2Assume that the project is always worth carrying out from the point of view of the regulator.
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Proposition 1 (Laont and Tirole [2]) (i) The regulator's problem is equivalent to pick-
ing a nondecreasing function e() : [; ] ! R to maximize the following objective func-
tion:
W  = maxW =
R


[u  (1 + )( (e()) +    e())]f()   0(e())F ()	 d
(ii) The optimal solution e() solves the following equation
 0(e()) = 1  
1 + 
F ()
f()
 00(e()): (3)
3 Example of a Nonpartition Equilibrium
Now we briey introduce the two-period version of the static model and discuss Laont
and Tirole's example of a nonpartition equilibrium. The timing of the two-period game is
as follows: (i) In the rst period, the regulator chooses a menu of contracts C1  R2; and
the rm, after observing its type, picks a contract in C1. (ii) The regulator observes the
contract (performance) taken by the rm in the rst period, and (iii) he then chooses the
second-period menu C2 optimally given his beliefs about the rm's type after observing
its rst-period choice. (iv) Finally, the rm makes its second-period choice in C2. Let
(s1(c()); c1()) 2 C1 denote the contract taken by rm  in the rst period. Dene
A() = f0 2 [; ]j(s1(c1(0)); c1(0)) = (s1(c1()); c1())g; the set of types that choose
the same contract as type  does in the rst period. Then fA()g2[;] is a partition of
the type space [; ].3 Let C2A  R2 denote the set of contracts oered by the regulator
3Again, we assume that it is worthwhile to implement the project in either period.
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to segment A in the second period and S2(c2(jA)); c2(jA)) 2 C2A the contract taken
by rm  2 A in the second period. The regulator acts to maximize the discounted
value of the social surplus W1 + W2, and the rm maximizes 1 + 2; where  is a
common discount factor with 0 <  < 1. We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as
our solution concept. First, we give some denitions.
Denition 1 For a given C1; a continuation equilibrium is a PBE for the subgame
following C1:
Denition 2 A continuation equilibrium is called a partition equilibrium if the number
of segments in the partition fA()g2[;] induced by C1 is countable and each segment is
connected.
Denition 3 A continuation equilibrium exhibits innite reswitching if there exist (s; c)
and (s0; c0) in C1 and an increasing sequence fkgk2N in [; ] s.t. c1(2k) = c and
c1(2k 1) = c0, k 2 N:
Denition 4 For a given "; a continuation equilibrium is said to exhibit pooling over a
large scale (1  ") if there exists (s; c) in C1 and   1  2   s.t. 2 1   1  " and
c1(1) = c1(2) = c:
In contrast to the static model in which the optimal incentive scheme is to fully
separate the types under a mild condition (see (ii) in Proposition 1), Laont and Tirole
demonstrate that in the dynamic model, for any given C1; there exists no continuation
equilibrium that fully separates types in the rst period. Hence some pooling is required
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in equilibrium. Moreover, they show that \much pooling" is necessary when the uncer-
tainty is small (  small), as can be seen in the following proposition. To do this, they
consider a sequence of economies with xed  and let the lower bound of the interval 
n
converge to  (the density is obtained by successive truncations of the initial density):
Proposition 2 (Laont and Tirole [3]) For any " > 0; there exists " <  such that for
any n such that 
n
 "; the equilibrium of the game on [n; ] must either (i) involve
at least a fraction (1   ") of rms producing at the same cost in the rst period or (ii)
exhibit both innite reswitching and pooling over a large scale (1  ") properties.
Therefore when the uncertainty is small, this proposition tells us that the equilibrium
must either be almost a fully pooling equilibrium or exhibit some sort of complexity
(reswitching) and pooling over a large scale. They construct a nonpartition continuation
equilibrium for a given menu with two rst-period contracts CNP1 = f(s; c); (es;ec)g which
exhibits both innite reswitching and pooling over a large scale properties and make the
following conjecture [3, p.1164]:
It can also be shown that c and ec can be chosen arbitrarily close (by choos-
ing e close to ); hence, a priori, this equilibrium need not be suboptimal for
small uncertainty.
In the following, however, we show that this conjecture is incorrect. First, we intro-
duce the nonpartition continuation equilibrium that they construct. Assume the game
has the following structure: a quadratic disutility of eort  (e) = e2=2;   = 1 and the
9
prior density f1 is uniform on [; ] : f1 = 1: The regulator oers two contracts in the rst
period: CNP1 = f(s; c); (es;ec)g with c < ec and s > es: These two contracts are set to extract
all surplus from type ; therefore we have the condition s  (  c) = es  ( ec) = 0:
In this nonpartition continuation equilibrium, there is some e 2 (; ) such that rms in
[; e] take contract (s; c); and rms in [e; ]; who are indierent between (s; c) and (es;ec)
in equilibrium, take contract (s; c) with probability q = 1+
e ec c 2 (0; 1) and contract
(es;ec) with probability 1   q:4 Let () denote the probability rm  chooses c in the
rst period. Then in this nonpartition continuation equilibrium
() =
8>><>>:
1 if  2 [; e]
q = 1+
e ec c if  2 [e; ] (4)
It can be readily seen that this continuation equilibrium exhibits innite reswitching
and pooling over a large scale (1  ") properties.
In order to show that the nonpartition continuation equilibrium induced by CNP1 is not
optimal, we consider two alternative menus, CP11 and CP21 : First let us describe CP11 and its
continuation equilibrium. CP11 consist of two contracts: CP11 = f(sP1 ; c); (esP1 ;ec)g; where
esP1 = es =  (   ec) and sP1 is determined by the equation sP1   (e c)22 = esP1   (e ec)22 +
2(ejec): 2(ejec) is the prot rm e can get in the second period if he takes (esP1 ;ec) in
the rst period: By comparing CNP1 and CP11 ; we observe that CNP1 and CP11 share the
same cost targets c and ec. For CP11 ; we have a partition continuation equilibrium with the
following property: all rms in [; e] take (sP1 ; c); and all rms in [e; ] take (esP1 ;ec). Now
4Hence e can be any number between  and  + 1+

(ec  c):
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let us describe CP21 : CP21 contains only one of the two contracts in CNP1 ; CP21 = f(s; c)g;
and in a partition continuation equilibrium induced by CP21 all rms take the contract in
the rst period; therefore it is a fully pooling equilibrium. In terms of the probability
of rm  2 [e; ] choosing c in the rst period; () in [e; ]; these three continuation
equilibria have the following properties: In the nonpartition continuation equilibrium
induced by CNP1 ; all rms in [e; ] play an \interior" strategy () = q 2 (0; 1): On the
other hand, all rms in [e; ] play a \corner" strategy in the two partition continuation
equilibria induced by CP11 and CP21 : () = 0 in the partition continuation equilibrium
induced by CP11 and () = 1 for the fully pooling continuation equilibrium induced by
CP21 .
By computing the welfare for these three continuation equilibria, we show that one or
the other partition continuation equilibrium is necessarily better than the nonpartition
continuation equilibrium induced by CNP1 : Let WNP1 + WNP2 denote the discounted
value of the social surplus in the nonpartition continuation equilibrium, WP11 +W
P1
2 the
discounted value of the social surplus in the rst partition continuation equilibrium, and
WP21 + W
P2
2 the discounted value of the social surplus in the fully pooling continuation
equilibrium.
Lemma 1 IfWNP1 +W
NP
2  (WP21 +WP22 )  0; thenWNP1 +WNP2  (WP11 +WP12 ) < 0
Proof. Please see the Appendix.
Given the rst-period menu CNP1 and the nonpartition continuation equilibrium in-
duced by CNP1 , Lemma 1 says that we can construct two alternative rst-period menus
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CP11 and CP21 leading to partition continuation equilibria and that the regulator's payos,
the discounted value of the social surplus, can be improved upon by one of our two
partition equilibria.
The intuition behind this result comes from the tradeo between production eciency
and information rent. Oering more contracts in the rst period allows the regulator
to learn the rm's type better, and consequently alleviates the eciency distortion in
the second period. To do this, however, the regulator needs to pay a higher information
rent to the high-type rm for revealing its type. The fully pooling continuation equilib-
rium does not separate types, and hence it has the highest eciency distortion in the
second period. The regulator, however, does not need to pay the information rent in
the rst period. Contrary to the fully pooling continuation equilibrium, the nonparti-
tion continuation equilibrium allows the regulator to partially separate types by sorting
some low types out and to alleviate the eciency distortion in the second period. If the
nonpartition continuation equilibrium dominates the fully pooling continuation equilib-
rium in the sense that it has a higher discounted social surplus, then the benet from
alleviating the eciency distortion is larger than the cost of separating types in the rst
period. In this case, the rst partition continuation equilibrium, which separates types
further, should dominate the nonpartition continuation equilibrium. Furthermore, it is
not hard to see from the proof in the Appendix that Lemma 1 holds for any interval
[; ] with a uniform distribution. Hence the nonpartition continuation equilibrium is
suboptimal even for small uncertainty. Undoubtedly our result relies a good deal on the
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quadratic structure of the social welfare function, but at least in this specic example we
gain intuition into why a nonpartition continuation equilibrium could be dominated by a
partition continuation equilibrium. The following proposition states our result formally.
Proposition 3 Whether the uncertainty is small or not, one of two partition continu-
ation equilibria, induced by CP11 or CP21 ; yields a higher payo for the principal than the
nonpartition continuation equilibrium induced by CNP1 . Hence Laont and Tirole's menu
of contracts, giving rise to a nonpartition continuation equilibrium, is not optimal.
The diculty in fully characterizing the set of equilibria arises from the complexity
of the partition on the type space induced by arbitrary C1. As mentioned earlier, if
we are able to show that the optimal contract induces a partition continuation equilib-
rium, solving for the optimal contract is possible (see [1, 5]). There are two possible
approaches to deal with this issue. First, we can attempt to show that for any non-
partition continuation equilibrium there exists a partition continuation equilibrium that
dominates this nonpartition continuation equilibrium as we did above. Alternatively, we
can construct a sequence of partition continuation equilibria that approximates this non-
partition continuation equilibrium, making it reasonable for us to search for the optimal
contract within the class of partition equilibria. Second, we notice that a nonpartition
continuation equilibrium emerges as the result of the multiplicity of intersections of value
functions with dierent contracts in C1: To be precise, suppose we have a nonpartition
continuation equilibrium with the partition fA()g2[;] induced by C1; and the princi-
pal chooses second-period contracts optimally in each segment A(): Given this, a value
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function for some contract (s; c) in C1 is the locus between the agent's type  and the
maximum discounted sum of utilities that he can get conditional on (s; c) being chosen
by  in the rst period. Since it is a nonpartition continuation equilibrium, we must
have two value functions associated with two contracts in C1 with multiple intersections.
In other words, we can say that the \dynamic" single crossing condition fails in non-
partition continuation equilibria. In this regard, perhaps we can eschew the diculty of
fully characterizing the set of equilibria by imposing a condition on the agent's objective
function to guarantee that the dynamic single crossing condition holds. In that case,
any continuation equilibrium induced by any C1 is partitional, and hence we can search
for the optimal contract within the class of partition equilibria.
4 Conclusion
For the specic example constructed by Laont and Tirole [3], we show that, whether
uncertainty is small or not, their nonpartition continuation equilibrium is not optimal.
It is still unclear, however, whether an equilibrium is partitional in the general dynamic
contracting problem without commitment, and work remains to be done to search for
the optimal contract. We plan to pursue this line of research in the future.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we derive the discounted value of the social surplus for each con-
tinuation equilibrium. We then calculate the social surplus dierences WNP1 + W
NP
2  
14
(WP11 + W
P1
2 ) and W
NP
1 + W
NP
2   (WP21 + WP22 ).
(I) Derive WNP1 + W
NP
2 : By the construction, the rm with type  is indierent
between (s; c) and (es;ec): Hence the following condition must hold:
s   (   c) = es   (   ec) = 0;
which gives us
s =
(   c)2
2
(5)
es = (   ec)2
2
Now let f and ef denote the posterior densities given that c and ec have been chosen
in the rst period. We have:
f =
8>><>>:
1e +( e)g if  2 [; e]
ge +( e)g if  2 [e; ]
ef =
8>><>>:
0 if  2 [; e]
1
 e if  2 [e; ]
(6)
Let e() and e() denote the regulator's optimal incentive schemes in the second pe-
riod onA = f0 2 [; ]j(s1(c1(0)); c1(0)) = (s; c)g and eA = f0 2 [; ]j(s1(c1(0)); c1(0)) =
(es;ec)g: Applying (ii) in Proposition 1, we get
e() =
8>><>>:
1  1+(   ) if  2 [; e]
1  1+(
e 
g +    e) if  2 [e; ] (7)
e() = 1  
1 + 
(   e);  2 [e; ]
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With the use of (i) in Proposition 1, we can get
WNP1 + W
NP
2 =
eR

[u  (1 + )(s+ c) + s  (   c)
2
2
]d +
R
e [u  (1 + )(s+ c) + s 
(   c)2
2
]gd
+
R
e [u  (1 + )(es+ ec) + es 
(   ec)2
2
](1  g)d
+f
eR

[u  (1 + )( (e()) +    e())   0(e())(   )]d
+
R
e [[u  (1 + )( (e
()) +    e())]g    0(e())(e    + (   e)g)]d
+
R
e [[u  (1 + )( (e()) +    e())](1  g)   0(e())(   e)(1  g)]dg
(II) DeriveWP11 +W
P1
2 : Denote 2(jec) to be the prot rm  can get in the second
period if he has chosen ec in the rst period. By construction, the following conditions
must hold:
esP1    (   ec) = esP1   (   ec)2
2
= 0; (8)
sP1   (
e   c)2
2
= esP1   (e   ec)2
2
+ 2(ejec)
Now let fP and efP denote the posterior densities given that c and ec have been chosen
in the rst period. We have:
fP =
8>><>>:
1e  if  2 [; e]
0 if  2 [e; ]
efP =
8>><>>:
0 if  2 [; e]
1
 e if  2 [e; ]
(9)
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Let eP1() and eP1() denote the regulator's optimal incentive schemes in the second
period for the rm choosing c and ec repectively. Applying (ii) in Proposition 1, we get
eP1() = 1 

1 + 
(   );  2 [; e] (10)
eP1() = 1  1 + (   e);  2 [e; ]
With the use of (i) in Proposition 1, we can get
WP11 + W
P1
2 =
eR

[u  (1 + )(sP1 + c) + sP1   (   c)
2
2
]d +
R
e [u  (1 + )(esP1 + ec) + esP1  
(   ec)2
2
]d
+f
eR

[u  (1 + )( (eP1()) +    eP1())   0(eP1())(   )]d
+
R
e [u  (1 + )( (eP1()) +    eP1())   0(eP1())(   e)]dg
(III) Derive WP21 + W
P2
2 : By construction, s =
( c)2
2 : Since all types choose the
same contract, the posterior density is equal to the prior density. Let eP2() denote the
regulator's optimal incentive scheme in the second period. Applying (ii) in Proposition
1 we get
eP2() = 1 

1 + 
(   );  2 [; ] (11)
With the use of (i) in Proposition 1, we can get
WP21 + W
P2
2 =
R

[u  (1 + )(s+ c) + s  (   c)
2
2
]d (12)
+
R

[u  (1 + )( (eP2()) +    eP2())   0(eP2())(   )]d
(IV) Calculate the dierence WNP1  WP11 : To make the calculation clear, we divide
it into several steps:
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(i) First we notice that
sP1   s = (
e   c)2
2
+
(   ec)2
2
  (
e   ec)2
2
+ 2(ejec)  (   c)2
2
(13)
=
 2ec  2ec+ 2eec+ 2c
2
+ 2(ejec)
= 2(ejec)  (   e)(ec  c)
(ii) Applying the envelope theorem gives us 02(jec) =   0(eP1()) =  eP1():
Therefore
2(ejec) =   Re 02(jec)d =
R
e eP1()d =
R
e [1 

1 + 
(  e)]d =   e  
1 + 
(   e)2
2
(iii) We also have
R
e [(1 + )(es+ ec)  es+
(   ec)2
2
]d  
R
e [(1 + )(s+ c)  s+
(   c)2
2
]d (14)
=
R
e [(1 + )(ec  c) + (es  s) +
 2(ec  c) + ec2   c2
2
]d
= [(1 + )(ec  c) + (es  s)](   e)  2   e2
2
(ec  c) + ec2   c2
2
(   e)
= [(1 + )(ec  c) + (   ec)2   (   c)2
2
](   e)  (   e)(ec  c)( + e   ec  c)
2
= (ec  c)(   e)[1 +   (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2
]
(iv) Using results (i)-(iii), the rst-period social surplus dierence WNP1  WP11 can
be simplied as:
WNP1  WP11
=
eR

[u  (1 + )(s+ c) + s  (   c)
2
2
]d +
R
e [u  (1 + )(s+ c) + s 
(   c)2
2
]gd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+
R
e [u  (1 + )(es+ ec) + es 
(   ec)2
2
](1  g)d   f
eR

[u  (1 + )(sP1 + c) + sP1   (   c)
2
2
]d
+
R
e [u  (1 + )(esP1 + ec) + esP1  
(   ec)2
2
]dg
=
eR

(sP1   s)d +
R
e [u  (1 + )(s+ c) + s 
(   c)2
2
]gd  
R
e [u  (1 + )(es+ ec) + es 
(   ec)2
2
]gd
=
eR

(sP1   s)d +
R
e [(1 + )(es+ ec)  es+
(   ec)2
2
]gd  
R
e [(1 + )(s+ c)  s+
(   c)2
2
]gd
= [2(ejec)  (   e)(ec  c)](e   ) + g(ec  c)(   e)[1 +   (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2
]
= (e   )[(   e   
1 + 
(   e)2
2
)  (   e)(ec  c)]
+

1 + 
e   ec  c (ec  c)(   e)[1 +   (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c2 ]
= (e   )[(   e   
1 + 
(   e)2
2
)  (   e)(ec  c) + (   e)(1  (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
)]
= (e   )(   e)[2   
1 + 
   e
2
  (ec  c)  (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
]
(V) Calculate WNP2  WP12 : First we notice that e() = eP1() on [; e]; e() =
eP1() on [e; ] and e() = e()  d on [e; ]; where
d =

1 + 
e   
g
=

1 + 
(e   )(1 + )(ec  c)
(e   ) = ec  c : (15)
Therefore,
WNP2  WP12 =
R
e [[u  (1 + )( (e
()) +    e())]g    0(e())(e    + (   e)g)]d (16)
 g
R
e [u  (1 + )( (e()) +    e())   0(e())(   e)]d
= g[
R
e [(1 + )( (e())  e()) +  0(e())(   e)]d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 
R
e [(1 + )( (e
())  e()) +  0(e())(   e)]d]  Re  0(e())(e   )d
Since
R
e [(1 + )( (e())  e()) +  0(e())(   e)]  [(1 + )( (e())  e()) +  0(e())(   e)]d
=
R
e [(1 + )(
(e())2
2
  e()) + e()(   e)]  [(1 + )((e())2
2
  e()) + e()(   e)]d
=
R
e [(1 + )(
(e())2
2
  e()) + e()(   e)]  [(1 + )((e()  d)2
2
  e() + d)
+(e()  d)(   e)]d
=  
R
e [(1 + )(
 2e()d+ d2
2
+ d)  d(   e)]d
=  
R
e [(1 + )(

1 + 
(   e)d+ d2
2
)  d(   e)]d
=  
R
e (1 + )
d2
2
d =  (1 + )d
2
2
(   e)
and
R
e  
0(e())(e   )d = (e   ) Re [1 

1 + 
(
e   
g
+    e)]d
= (e   )[(1  
1 + 
e   
g
)(   e)  
1 + 
(   e)2
2
]
= (e   )(   e)[1  
1 + 
e   
g
  
1 + 
   e
2
]
= (e   )(   e)[1  ec  c

  
1 + 
   e
2
];
the second-period social social surplus dierence WNP2  WP12 can be simplied as:
WNP2  WP12 = g[
R
e [(1 + )( (e())  e()) +  0(e())(   e)]d (17)
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 
R
e [(1 + )( (e
())  e()) +  0(e())(   e)]d]  Re  0(e())(e   )d
=  g(1 + )d
2
2
(   e)  (e   )(   e)[1  ec  c

  
1 + 
   e
2
]
=   
1 + 
e   ec  c (1 + )12(ec  c )2(   e)  (e   )(   e)[1  ec  c   1 +     e2 ]
=  (e   )(   e)[1  1
2
ec  c

  
1 + 
   e
2
]
(VI) We now simplify WNP1 + W
NP
2   (WP11 + WP12 ) using the results in (IV) and
(V):
WNP1 + W
NP
2   (WP11 + WP12 ) (18)
= (e   )(   e)[2   
1 + 
   e
2
  (ec  c)  (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
]
 (e   )(   e)[1  1
2
ec  c

  
1 + 
   e
2
]
= (e   )(   e)[1  
1 + 
   e
2
  ec  c

  (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
+
1
2
ec  c

+

1 + 
   e
2
]
= (e   )(   e)[1  1
2
ec  c

  (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
]
(VII) Simplify WNP1  WP21 : From (I), (III) and (iii) in (IV) we can get:
WNP1  WP21 = (1  g)f
R
e [u  (1 + )(es+ ec) + es 
(   ec)2
2
]  [u  (1 + )(s+ c) + s  (   c)
2
2
]dg
=  (1  g)(ec  c)(   e)[1 +   (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2
]
(VIII) Simplify WNP2  WP22 : From (I) and (III) we have
WNP2  WP22 =
eR

[u  (1 + )( (e()) +    e())   0(e())(   )]d
+
R
e [[u  (1 + )( (e
()) +    e())]g    0(e())(e    + (   e)g)]d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+
R
e [[u  (1 + )( (e()) +    e())](1  g)   0(e())(   e)(1  g)]d
 
R

[u  (1 + )( (eP2()) +    eP2())   0(eP2())(   )]d
=
R
e [(1 + )( (e

P2())  eP2()) +  0(eP2())(   )]d
 
R
e [(1 + )( (e
())  e())g +  0(e())(e    + (   e)g)]d
 
R
e [(1 + )( (e())  e())(1  g) +  0(e())(   e)(1  g)]d
First, we notice that eP2() = e
() + d1 on [e; ]; where d1 = 1+ 1 gg (e   ): Then
g
R
e [(1 + )( (e

P2())  eP2()) +  0(eP2())(   )]d (19)
 
R
e [(1 + )( (e
())  e())g +  0(e())(e    + (   e)g)]d
= g
R
e [(1 + )(
(e() + d1)2
2
  e()  d1) + (e() + d1)(   )]d
 
R
e [(1 + )(
(e())2
2
  e())g + e()(e    + (    +    e)g)]d
= g
R
e [(1 + )(
2e()d1 + d12
2
  d1) + d1(   )  e()(
e   
g
+    e)]d
= g
R
e [e
()((1 + )d1   1  g
g
(e   )) + (1 + )(d12
2
  d1) + d1(   )]d
= gd1
R
e [(1 + )(
d1
2
  1) + (   )]d
On the other hand, we have eP2() = e()+d2 on [e; ]; where d2 =   1+(e ) =
22
  g1 gd1: Hence,
(1  g)f
R
e [(1 + )( (e

P2())  eP2()) +  0(eP2())(   )]d (20)
 
R
e [(1 + )( (e())  e()) +  0(e())(   e)]dg
= (1  g)f
R
e [(1 + )(
(e() + d2)2
2
  e()  d2) + (e() + d2)(   )]d
 
R
e [(1 + )(
(e())2
2
  e()) + e()(   e)]dg
= (1  g)
R
e [(1 + )(
2e()d2 + d22
2
  d2) + d2(   ) + e()(e   )]d
= (1  g)
R
e [e()((1 + )d2 + (e   )) + (1 + )(
d2
2
2
  d2) + d2(   )]d
= (1  g)d2
R
e [(1 + )(
d2
2
  1) + (   )]d
Using these two results, WNP2  WP22 can be simplied as:
WNP2  WP22 =
R
e [(1 + )( (e

P2())  eP2()) +  0(eP2())(   )]d
 
R
e [(1 + )( (e
())  e())g +  0(e())(e    + (   e)g)]d
 
R
e [(1 + )( (e())  e())(1  g) +  0(e())(   e)(1  g)]d
= gd1
R
e [(1 + )(
d1
2
  1) + (   )]d + (1  g)d2
R
e [(1 + )(
d2
2
  1) + (   )]d
= gd1[
R
e [(1 + )(
d1
2
  1) + (   )]d  
R
e [(1 + )(
d2
2
  1) + (   )]d]
= gd1(1 + )
   e
2
(d1   d2)
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= g

1 + 
1  g
g
(e   )(1 + )   e
2

1 + 
1
g
(e   )
=
1  g
g
2
1 + 
(e   )2   e
2
(IX) Combining (VII) and (VIII), WNP1 + W
NP
2   (WP21 + WP22 ) can be simplied
as:
WNP1 + W
NP
2   (WP21 + WP22 ) (21)
=  (1  g)(ec  c)(   e)[1 +   (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2
] + 
1  g
g
2
1 + 
(e   )2   e
2
=  (1  g)(ec  c)(   e)[1 +   (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2
]
+(1  g)(1 + )(ec  c)
(e   ) 
2
1 + 
(e   )2   e
2
= (1  g)(ec  c)(   e)(1 + )[ 1 + (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
+
(e   )
2(1 + )
]
(X) If WNP1 + W
NP
2   (WP21 + WP22 )  0; then from (IX) we know the following
must be true:
 1 + (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
+
(e   )
2(1 + )
 0: (22)
Using the result in (VI), we get
WNP1 + W
NP
2   (WP11 + WP12 ) (23)
= (e   )(   e)[1  1
2
ec  c

  (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
]
= (e   )(   e)[1  1
g
(e   )
2(1 + )
  (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
]
< (e   )(   e)[1  (e   )
2(1 + )
  (2   ec  c) +  + e   ec  c
2(1 + )
]  0
Q.E.D.
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